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INQUIRE=DOC20D
ITEM NO=00079072
ENVELOPE
CDSN = LGX823 MCN = 92336/17640 TOR = 923361139
RTTCZYUW RUEKJCS2293 3361135-CCCC--RUEALGX.
ZNY CCCCC
HEADER
R 011135Z DEC 92
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC
RUFGAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GE
RUVKSRT/12 AF BERGSTROM AFB TX//IN//
RUEOACC/CDRPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC//AORC-POG-SB//
RUANJTF/CJTF FOUR
RUCBSAA/USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA//J2//
RUWANGC/CJTF FIVE//J20//
RUWSMXI/AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUWANTX/CJTF SIX
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM
RULKQAN/MARCORINTCEN QUANTICO VA
RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC
RUEALGX/SAFE
R 011132Z DEC 92
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC//INM-LEVITSKY// 4802
RUWMEGA/USCINCSO HOWARD AFB PM//SCJ3-DDD/USCS-LNO//
INFO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//CD-JIC/CD-JIC-TS//
RUEBMRA/CUSTOMS WASHDC//DIR//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC//CNC//
RHEHOND/ONDCP WASHDC
RUEHNA/DEA WASHDC//A,AD/OC/OF/OFL/AO/OS/OIC/OISL//
RUEDEEA/COGARDCOMLANTAREA NEW YORK//AI//
RUEHMA/DEA ADDISON//BLOEMKE//
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC//DEA REP//
RUWTNGA/SSC CORPUS CHRISTI TX//DIR,SSC/DIR,CNAC//
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM//CINC/SCJ2-O//
BT
CONTROLS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LA PAZ 018592

E. O. 12356:DECL: OAD

/********** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE **********/
BODY
TAGS: SNAR, BL
SUBJ: OPERATION GHOST ZONE; P-3 DEPLOYMENT NOV 92
AFTER ACTION REPORT

1. (C) THE RECENT (19-24 NOV) DEPLOYMENT OF THE USCS P-3 SLICK TO THE BOLIVIAN THEATRE AND THE OPERATION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IS/FPC/CDR Date. 5/26/95
MR Cases Only:
EO Citations
TS authority to:
RELEASE
EXCISE
DENY
DELETE Non-Responsive Info
DECLASSIFY
DECLASSIFY in PART
CLASSIFY as ( ) S or ( ) C OADR
DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C OADR
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

DESIGNED TO EXPLOIT ITS PRESENCE WERE SUCCESSFUL IN MANY WAYS IN SPITE OF MECHANICAL AND COORDINATION DIFFICULTIES. ALL OF THE ASSETS IDENTIFIED IN REF A WERE IN PLACE AND AVAILABLE FOR THE OPERATION. A TOTAL OF OVER 125 FLYING HOURS WERE LOGGED DURING THE FIVE OPERATIONAL DAYS OF THIS OPERATION.

2. (C) THE TWO PC-7 AIRCRAFT ON STRIP ALERT AT THE CHIMORE BASE CAMP WERE AN INVALUABLE ASSET. THEY WERE SCRAMBLED ON SUSPECT TRACKS THREE TIMES AND SCRAMBLED SEVEN TIMES BASED ON INTEL OR TO COVER GAPS IN AIR SURVEILLANCE. THEIR RESPONSE TIME WAS LESS THAN TEN MINUTES ON EVERY OCCASION AND COORDINATION WITH OTHER AIRBORNE ASSETS WAS EXCELLENT DUE TO THE PRESENCE AT CHIMORE OF A BOLIVIAN AIR FORCE LIAISON OFFICER AND THE PRESENCE ON THE P-3 OF A D&M PAT TEAM MEMBER.

3. (C) THE RED DEVILS WERE STATIONED AT CHIMORE AND TRINIDAD. THE DEPLOYMENT OF TWO UH-LH TO SANTA CATALINA WAS CANCELLED DUE TO AIRFIELD LIMITATIONS. INSTEAD, A RED DEVIL CESSNA 206 WAS DEPLOYED TO THAT LOCATION TO ACT AS AN ADDITIONAL INTERCEPTOR. THE CESSNA 206 EXPERIENCED MAINTENANCE PROBLEMS AND THE INCESSANT RAIN RENDERED THEIR RUNWAY UNUSEABLE FOR AT LEAST ONE DAY. THE 206 DID HOWEVER FLY OVER SIX HOURS OF PATROL AND WAS THE ASSET THAT INITIALLY DETECTED THE SUSPECT TRACK ON 24 NOV.

4. (C) THE RED DEVILS, THE DEA AEROCOMMANDER AND THE CASA 212 PERFORMED AS FRAGGED AND LOST NO STATION TIME EXCEPT FOR WEATHER.

5. (C) THE USCS P-3 DEPLOYED TO THE VIRU VIRU AIRPORT IN SANTA CRUZ ON 19 NOV 92. THE FIRST P-3 MISSION DAY WAS 20 NOV 92. DUE TO THE LATE EVENING ARRIVAL OF THE AIRCRAFT, THE FIRST MISSION WAS AN AFTERNOON SORTIE. SINCE TRAFFICKERS TYPICALLY FLY DURING THE EARLY HOURS, NO TRAFFIC WAS EXPECTED AND NONE WAS OBSERVED. THE MISSION DURATION WAS SHORTENED TO ALLOW SUFFICIENT CREW REST FOR AN EARLY MISSION THE FOLLOWING DAY.

6. (C) 21 NOV 92 MISSION STARTED AT DAYBREAK AND RESULTED IN THE TRACKING AND IDENTIFICATION OF FOUR SUSPECT TRACKS. AFTER THE P-3 LEFT STATION, INTEL WAS RECEIVED INDICATING TRAFFICKING ACTIVITY EARLY THE NEXT DAY. SINCE THE PUBLISHED SCHEDULE SHOWED AN AFTERNOON MISSION, THE CREW HAD BEEN RELEASED AND COULD NOT BE LOCATED IN TIME TO ALLOW FOR THE REQUIRED CREW REST.

7. (C) FORTUNATELY, THE SUSPECT TRAFFICKERS COULD NOT FLY ON 22 NOV DUE TO POOR WEATHER. DUE TO MECHANICAL

PROBLEMS, THE P-3 MISSION WAS CANCELLED ANYWAY. THE MISSION TIME FOR THE FOLLOWING DAY'S P-3 MISSION WAS ADJUSTED TO A 0500 TAKEOFF TO ATTEMPT TO INTERCEPT THE DELAYED TRAFFICKING MISSION.

8. (C) ON 23 NOV 92, THE P-3 LAUNCHED ON TIME BUT THE WEATHER WAS SO POOR THAT THE MISSION WAS CURTAILED AFTER ONLY TWO HOURS OF STATION TIME. BEFORE LEAVING STATION, THE P-3 WAS ASKED TO BE ON ALERT TO LAUNCH LATER IN THE DAY IF THE WEATHER CLEARED. REAL TIME INTELLIGENCE AT 1430 INDICATED THAT TWO TRAFFICKER AIRCRAFT WOULD BE TAKING OFF MOMENTARILY. WHEN ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT THE P-3 CREW AT VIRU VIRU WERE MADE, IT WAS LEARNED THAT THE CREW HAD GONE TO THEIR HOTEL. WHEN CONTACTED THEY WERE SCRAMBLED. DUE TO MECHANICAL PROBLEMS THE P-3 WAS UNABLE TO LAUNCH. SUBSEQUENTLY, ONE SUSPECT AIRCRAFT WAS TURNED BACK BY THE FAB PC-7S, BUT THE OTHER ONE SUCCESSFULLY C
OMPLETED
ITS MISSION AND PICKED UP 360 KGS OF COCAINE BASE.

9. (C) ON THE MORNING OF 24 NOV 92 THE P-3 WAS SCHEDULED TO BE AIRBORNE AT 0900. CHIMORE HEARD FROM THE P-3 CREW AT 1015 WHEN THEY CHECKED IN ON SATCOM. SHORTLY AFTERWARDS, THE CESSNA 206 CALLED IN REPORTING THAT IT WAS IN PURSUIT OF A SUSPECT AIRCRAFT. THE P-3 BECAME AIRBORNE AND JOINED THE CHASE. THE SUSPECT AIRCRAFT LANDED IN THE VICINITY OF SANTA CRUZ AND WAS NOT REACQUIRED.

/****** BEGINNING OF SECTION 002 ******/
10. (C) THE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED IN THIS DEPLOYMENT WERE AGAIN IN COORDINATING BETWEEN THE P-3 CREW AND THE OPERATIONS CENTER AT CHIMORE. THE FACT THAT THERE IS ONLY ONE TELEPHONE LINE INTO THE DEA COMPOUND AT CHIMORE MAKES TELEPHONIC COMMUNICATION UNRELIABLE AT BEST. THIS TELEPHONE WAS ALSO MALFUNCTIONING DURING THIS DEPLOYMENT. UHF SATCOM ON THE OTHER HAND IS AN EXTREMELY RELIABLE SECURE COMM LINK. THE LOCATION OF THE USCS SATCOM RADIO IN THE DEA FACILITY AT SANTA CRUZ WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM, SINCE THE CREW DID NOT HAVE A KEY TO THE ROOM WHERE IT WAS KEPT AND THE FACILITY IS CLOSED WEEKENDS.

11. (C) DUE TO THE PERISHABLE NATURE OF DRUG TRAFFICKING INTELLIGENCE, THE P-3 MUST BE PREPARED FOR CHANGES IN ITS FLYING SCHEDULE. WE REALIZE THAT A BIG AIRPLANE LIKE THE P-3 WITH A LARGE CREW TAKES SOME TIME TO GET AIRBORNE, AND WE ARE AWARE OF THE CREW REST REQUIREMENTS, BUT THERE MUST BE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE FLYING SCHEDULE.

12. (C) TO REMEDY THE ABOVE PROBLEMS, WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES BE IMPLEMENTED.

A. (C) NO FLYING SCHEDULE BE PUBLISHED, BUT INSTEAD THAT A WINDOW BE ESTABLISHED DURING WHICH FLIGHTS MIGHT TAKE PLACE. THIS WINDOW WOULD PROBABLY BE FROM 0500-1700. FLIGHTS COULD BE LAUNCHED AND RECOVERED WITHIN THIS WINDOW EVERY DAY AND STILL ALLOW FOR CREW REST. THE BOLIVIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT REQUIRE SPECIFIC FLIGHT INFORMATION FOR THIS AIRCRAFT'S OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE, SO THAT WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM.

B. (C) TO DETERMINE THE SCHEDULE FOR THE FOLLOWING DAYS MISSION, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THE CREW COMMANDER CONTACT THE CHIMORE BASE CAMP AT A PRESCRIBED TIME EACH DAY. THIS COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE ON THE UHF SATCOM TO AVOID THE OBVIOUS TELEPHONE AND OPSEC PROBLEMS. THIS WOULD ALLOW FOR THE ANALYSIS OF INTEL GATHERED THAT DAY TO AFFECT THE TIMING OF THE P-3 MISSION.

13. (C) THESE RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD ENSURE CONNECTIVITY BETWEEN THE CHIMORE OPERATIONS CENTER AND THE CREW DURING NON-FLYING HOURS AND WOULD ENSURE THAT THE OPTION OF AN EARLY MORNING MISSION IS AVAILABLE EACH DAY.

14. (C) THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXECUTE THIS OPERATION WITH THE BENEFIT OF AT LEAST ONE AIR INTERCEPT RADAR EQUIPPED AIRCRAFT IS APPRECIATED, BUT CLEARLY THE TEAMING OF THE P-3A AND THE P-3 AEW WOULD HAVE GREATLY INCREASED OUR EFFECTIVENESS. THE LESSONS LEARNED IN THIS DEPLOYMENT ARE ALREADY ASSISTING IN THE PLANNING OF THE UPCOMING USAF E-3 AWACS DEPLOYMENT IN DECEMBER. WE WILL OBVIOUSLY CONTINUE THE INTERDICTION EFFORTS OF OPERATION GHOST ZONE AND C. R COUNTERNARCOTICS INTERDICTION OPERATIONS W.TH THE HELP OF SUCH AEW AND D&M DEPLOYMENTS.

15. (U) POC IS MAJOR JOHN HILES OR CAPTAIN IAN HARDING COMM (591)-2-322925 EXT 2225/2234

ADMIN
DECLAS:OADR

BOWERS
BT

#2294

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